ALEX_MEAD BILL_BRAMBLE CAPTAIN_OKAI CONTROLLER FIRST_OFFICER_RYAN GPWS LORENDA_WARD NARRATION NESWARD_MARFIL ROBERT_GRAVES SATHYA_SILVA FIRST OFFICER RYAN �Hey, man, we're going down.� CAPTAIN OKAI �We can't keep going down.� ROBERT GRAVES �Just hitting the water�s gonna tear the airplane apart.� CAPTAIN OKAI �We�re in the water! We�re in the water!� ALEX MEAD �They�re covered in gasoline and hydraulic fluid. So it wasn�t pretty.� CAPTAIN OKAI �Okay. Let�s see.� CAPTAIN OKAI �Okay, thank you. See ya.� ROBERT GRAVES �So this captain is highly experienced in the aircraft, been doing it for a while.� CAPTAIN OKAI �Engine start checklist.� FIRST OFFICER RYAN �Engine start checklist. Tail stand.� CAPTAIN OKAI �Removed.� FIRST OFFICER RYAN �Cargo.� ROBERT GRAVES �It�s not necessarily the best pilot career, straight up, but you do get to be in, in Hawaii. You get to fly an airplane.� FIRST OFFICER RYAN �Engine start checklist complete and... clear right.� CAPTAIN OKAI �Clear right.� FIRST OFFICER RYAN �Tower, Rhoades Express 810, taxi kilo.� CONTROLLER �Rhoades Express 810, Honolulu tower, runway 8 right, taxi via Charlie Romeo Tango Romeo Alpha.� ROBERT GRAVES �They had the postal contract, which was quite lucrative. Their focus was on keeping their costs down to maintain their advantage over more and well-established competitors.� ROBERT GRAVES �Twin engine, small aircraft, it was designed for short haul operations. It wasn�t very sophisticated. No automation. I loved flying that airplane.� FIRST OFFICER RYAN �Runway 8 right confirmed. Before takeoff checklist complete.� CONTROLLER �Rhoades 810, cleared for takeoff.� FIRST OFFICER RYAN �Runway 8 right, cleared for takeoff, Rhoades 810.� CAPTAIN OKAI �Okay. You have control.� FIRST OFFICER RYAN �Okay. I have control.� CAPTAIN OKAI �Engines stable. Eighty knots (150 kilometers per hour).� FIRST OFFICER RYAN �Check.� CAPTAIN OKAI �V-1. Rotate. V2. Positive rate.� FIRST OFFICER RYAN �Gear up.� FIRST OFFICER RYAN �Damn.� CAPTAIN OKAI �Lost an engine. You got it?� FIRST OFFICER RYAN �Yeah. I got it.� ROBERT GRAVES �Losing an engine after takeoff is one of the most critical events that can happen in a flight. You�re close to the ground, you�re slow. However, we also know from our training that the aircraft will fly perfectly well on one engine.� FIRST OFFICER RYAN �Flaps.� CAPTAIN OKAI �Turn 220 heading. I�ll give you the flaps.� FIRST OFFICER RYAN �Okay.� CAPTAIN OKAI �Rhoades 810. We have an emergency. Standby. We�re on 220 heading. You can inch up to 2,000 (610 meters).� ROBERT GRAVES �Anytime you have an emergency situation, maintain aircraft control. If you fail to do that, nothing else you do matters.� CAPTAIN OKAI �Okay Rhoades 810. We�ve lost an engine. We�re on a 220-heading maintaining 2,000 (610 meters). Declaring an emergency. How do you read?� CONTROLLER �Rhoades Express 810, you are cleared visual approach runway four right. You can turn in towards the airport.� CAPTAIN OKAI �Okay Rhoades 810. We�re gonna run a checklist. I�ll let you know when we�re ready to come to the airport.� CAPTAIN OKAI �Okay. I have control.� FIRST OFFICER RYAN �Roger.� CAPTAIN OKAI �Okay. Let�s see what�s the problem. What�s going on with the gauges?� FIRST OFFICER RYAN �So it looks like the number one.� CAPTAIN OKAI �Number one�s gone?� FIRST OFFICER RYAN �Gone, yeah. We still have the number two.� CAPTAIN OKAI �So we have number two. Okay.� CAPTAIN OKAI �Let�s do the engine failure shutdown checklist. And I have the radios now.� FIRST OFFICER RYAN �Okay.� ROBERT GRAVES �There�s a number of things this checklist is gonna do for you. It�s gonna confirm the failed engine and you�re gonna wanna secure that engine.� FIRST OFFICER RYAN �Okay. Engine failure or shutdown. When one of these occurs � an engine failure, an engine flameout. Another checklist directs an engine shutdown.� FIRST OFFICER RYAN �Hey, we�re red line here.� FIRST OFFICER RYAN �We should pull back on the right one a little bit.� CAPTAIN OKAI �Okay. We should head back to the airport.� FIRST OFFICER RYAN �Yeah, we should. Yeah.� ROBERT GRAVES �Problems on your second engine is going to significantly change your outlook because you�ve got the dark water below you and you know you�re running out of options.� CAPTAIN OKAI �Okay Rhoades 810. We�d like to come to the airport now. We might lose the other engine.� CONTROLLER �Rhoades Express 810, roger. Confirm you still have, uh, the airport in sight.� CAPTAIN OKAI �Uh negative.� FIRST OFFICER RYAN �Hey man, we�re going down.� CAPTAIN OKAI �We can�t keep going down.� FIRST OFFICER RYAN �We�re descending!� CAPTAIN OKAI �How�s the EGT?� FIRST OFFICER RYAN �Uh it�s max. It�s beyond max.� FIRST OFFICER RYAN �Do we go flaps? Flaps one?� CAPTAIN OKAI �No. No. Not� not� not yet.� FIRST OFFICER RYAN �Okay. We�re very slow though.� CAPTAIN OKAI �Shoot. Okay, flaps one.� ROBERT GRAVES �Just hitting the water�s gonna tear the airplane apart so you want to be at the lowest possible airspeed. The flaps will facilitate that.� CONTROLLER �Oh. Rhoades Express 810, low altitude alert.� CONTROLLER �Are you able to climb at all?� CAPTAIN OKAI �Uh negative. Can you let the Coast Guard know?� CONTROLLER �We will. Watch desk, please call the Coast Guard. Flight 810, a 737, is probably going to be in the water.� CAPTAIN OKAI �How�s the EGT?� FIRST OFFICER RYAN �Hot. Way over.� GPWS �Terrain. Terrain. Pull up.� CONTROLLER �Express 810, do you want Kalaeloa?� FIRST OFFICER RYAN �We want the closest runway available please.� CAPTAIN OKAI �Anything we can land on.� GPWS �Too low. Gear.� CAPTAIN OKAI �Okay. Give me a heading.� GPWS �Terrain. Terrain. Pull up.� CONTROLLER �Rhoades Express 810, the airport is about a three-one-zero heading from you.� GPWS �Pull up. Pull up. Pull up. Pull up. Terrain. Terrain. Pull up.� CAPTAIN OKAI �We�re in the water. We�re in the water!� CONTROLLER �Watch desk, 810�s in the water two miles (three kiloemters) south-east of Kalaeloa.� NESWARD MARFIL �Hearing that there�s a 737 that crashed, I� I didn�t believe it. But if there is and there�s 200 people in the water, what am I gonna do?� ALEX MEAD �They told me two souls onboard. We�re like all right, two�s a lot more manageable than like 200.� ALEX MEAD �There were a bunch of boxes now floating by us. I figured, all right, this might be the start of a debris field. So we started our second pass, and grabbing onto the vertical fin of the tail was one of our pilots.� ALEX MEAD �I was like, all right, he is still okay. Great. Still wanna find the second pilot.� NESWARD MARFIL �Right before we started to make the moves to put me in the water to go up to him, the plane moved.� ALEX MEAD �The captain is drowning right now.� NESWARD MARFIL �And as soon as I grabbed his hand, it�s like his eyes rolled back and he went limp.� ALEX MEAD �They�re dripping wet, covered in gasoline and hydraulic fluid, so it wasn�t pretty.� NESWARD MARFIL �Good planning, good crew, good decision-making and then implementing those decisions is how we came out on top.� LORENDA WARD (Archive) �Right now we�re in the fact-gathering phase. Once we finish the fact-gathering, we�ll switch into the analytical side and then that�s when we�ll go in to determine the probable cause and contributing factors.� SATHYA SILVA �What can you tell me about last night?� CONTROLLER �It was a normal night. Slow. There was another Transair flight inbound around the same time.� SATHYA SILVA �And when did Flight 810 alert you that there was a problem?� CONTROLLER �It was about, uh, two minutes into the flight they reported they�d lost an engine.� CAPTAIN OKAI �Okay Rhoades 810, we�ve lost an engine. We�re on a 220 heading, maintaining 2,000 (610 meters), declaring an emergency. How do you read?� CONTROLLER �They wanted to work on the problem before turning back.� SATHYA SILVA �Did they say which engine?� CONTROLLER �No. But not long after they said that, uh, they might lose the other engine as well.� SATHYA SILVA �Really?� CAPTAIN OKAI �Okay Rhoades 810. We�d like to come to the airport now. We might lose the other engine.� BILL BRAMBLE �The only information we had to go on initially was the communications between the airplane and the CONTROLLER. But the airplane and its recorders were at the bottom of the ocean.� SATHYA SILVA �Thank you.� SATHYA SILVA �At the depth that the airplane was at, it�s difficult to get divers down there. So in order to actually hook all of our equipment up to the aircraft and pull it up, we needed to use ROVs.� BILL BRAMBLE �Good morning.� CAPTAIN OKAI �Good morning.� BILL BRAMBLE �I�m glad to see you here.� CAPTAIN OKAI �So am I, very glad. Yeah.� BILL BRAMBLE �The purpose of this investigation is to determine probable cause and prevent recurrence. Our role is not to assign fault.� CAPTAIN OKAI �I understand.� LORENDA WARD �It�s critical to speak to pilots as soon as we can because we want to get those fresh memories.� BILL BRAMBLE �Walk me through what happened.� CAPTAIN OKAI �Everything was normal up to about 400 feet (120 meters).� FIRST OFFICER RYAN (Flashback) �Gear up. Damn.� CAPTAIN OKAI �There was a whoosh sort of a sound, not a pow. It was a whoosh. Then it was in a roll. And my first officer was able to counteract that.� CAPTAIN OKAI (Flashback) �Lost an engine. You got it?� FIRST OFFICER RYAN (Flashback) �Yeah. I got it.� CAPTAIN OKAI �Eventually we leveled off at 2,000 feet (610 meters) and I go, Greg, what do we have?� FIRST OFFICER RYAN (Flashback) �So it looks like the number one.� CAPTAIN OKAI (Flashback) �Number one�s gone?� FIRST OFFICER RYAN (Flashback) �Gone, yeah. We still have the number two.� CAPTAIN OKAI (Flashback) �So we have number two. Okay.� CAPTAIN OKAI �I�m looking at number 1 EPR, there�s no power. I�m looking at number 2, and the EPR it, it�s, it's coming down.� CAPTAIN OKAI (Flashback) �How�s the EGT?� FIRST OFFICER RYAN (Flashback) �Uh it�s max. It�s beyond max.� BILL BRAMBLE �Did both engines fail at the same time?� CAPTAIN OKAI �Most likely. That is my conclusion.� BILL BRAMBLE �Thank you. We�ll be in touch.� BILL BRAMBLE �The purpose of this investigation...� BILL BRAMBLE �A dual-engine failure seemed improbable, but both the crew seemed to agree that that is what had occurred. We couldn�t confirm or deny it unless we could actually look at the wreckage and get the recorders.� ROBERT GRAVES �You�re looking for an item that�s common to both engines, would cause them to both shut down at the same time. For that would be most likely the fuel.� BILL BRAMBLE �So one thing that we did do at the airport was take samples from the fuel truck that had been used to fuel the airplane before it departed.� ROBERT GRAVES �If you have water in your fuel, that was most likely to be the cause of fuel contamination.� SATHYA SILVA �We actually found that the fuel that was in the aircraft conformed to standards as we would expect.� BILL BRAMBLE �So according to the pilots, they lose the left engine first and then the right.� SATHYA SILVA �All the samples from the fuel truck tested clean. What was the weather like on that night? Any volcanic activity?� ROBERT GRAVES �Volcanic ash is very bad for jet engines. It�s like throwing sand in the gears. Jet engines will shut down.� BILL BRAMBLE �Nothing here. Clear night. SATHYA SILVA �So that leaves maintenance.� LORENDA WARD �There were no reports of volcanic ash on that night. The only information that we have to work on is what the crew was telling us that they had a dual engine failure. So we�re gonna look at the maintenance on the engines.� SATHYA SILVA �Often with water recoveries, we have an airplane that�s in multiple different pieces. They�re usually smaller pieces and they�re less heavy. So to bring them up intact was a bigger engineering problem.� SATHYA SILVA �The plane is, what, like forty-something years old?� BILL BRAMBLE �Uh 46. Flown over 69,000 cycles. The engines have been around too � the left engine 32,000 flying hours and the right over 70,000.� SATHYA SILVA �Engines that old are going to need upkeep.� ROBERT GRAVES �Jet engines are very solid machines. With proper inspection and maintenance, they can fly on forever.� SATHYA SILVA �Anything in the FAA database?� BILL BRAMBLE �I�ve got three reports on this aircraft. The most recent was two and a half years ago � left engine failure at 2,000 feet (610 meters). SATHYA SILVA �That�s something.� SATHYA SILVA �Both engines were serviced two years ago and underwent a daily check the day before the accident flight.� BILL BRAMBLE �Did they report anything?� SATHYA SILVA �No discrepancies.� BILL BRAMBLE �It�s possible that maintenance could have missed something.� SATHYA SILVA �Call your contacts at the FAA. Maybe they can shed some light on Transair. And I�ll speak to maintenance personally.� BILL BRAMBLE �Because of the possibility that there had been a dual engine failure, we did a deep dive on the maintenance organization at the airline trying to find potential theories for something that could have gone wrong.� SATHYA SILVA �A bit of a mess over there at Transair maintenance.� BILL BRAMBLE �What did you find out?� SATHYA SILVA �Chief maintenance inspector quit six weeks ahead of the accident citing chronic maintenance issues and being understaffed. I also found multiple reports from different pilots about engines overheating.� BILL BRAMBLE �We noticed so many of these reported issues with temperature that we were starting to think that this might really involve a maintenance issue. There was just so much smoke, we thought there had to be some fire.� BILL BRAMBLE �Anything specific to the accident aircraft?� SATHYA SILVA �No. They involved other airplanes. Not exactly a smoking gun. Anything from the FAA?� BILL BRAMBLE �Most of the current inquiries into the company are policy and procedure related. Nothing to do with engine maintenance.� SATHYA SILVA �We need those engines.� BILL BRAMBLE �So even though we were discovering these issues with pilot reports and maintenance records, there wasn�t anything clearly indicating a specific problem that would have led to this reported dual engine failure.� LORENDA WARD �This was one of the largest water recovery efforts we have done in a couple decades.� LORENDA WARD �To be able to see that wreckage come up just creates immense satisfaction because you�re like, okay, now� now we can start this in earnest." SATHYA SILVA �Let�s start with this one.� BILL BRAMBLE �It�s in better shape than I expected.� LORENDA WARD �They were in pretty good shape. There was damage due to the water impact.� SATHYA SILVA �Let�s take a look inside.� SATHYA SILVA �There. Take a look.� BILL BRAMBLE �Broken fan blades.� SATHYA SILVA �See if there�s any damage downstream. Multiple puncture marks on the turbine.� BILL BRAMBLE �With that type of damage, the engine could have easily overheated.� BILL BRAMBLE �The pilots were correct. The right engine was giving them trouble.� LORENDA WARD �So from the examination on the right engine, they were able to see that there were blades that had fractured in the high-pressure turbine. But it was only those two. And they knew that it would still be able to produce power, so it wasn�t like a complete failure.� SATHYA SILVA �It looks like rust and corrosion inside of the blades caused them to rupture.� BILL BRAMBLE �The routine maintenance inspection procedures contained in the maintenance manual would not necessarily have revealed the presence of cracks or one fractured blade.� BILL BRAMBLE �So this is the engine the pilots said failed first.� SATHYA SILVA �Let�s see what we got. It looks fine. No internal damage.� SATHYA SILVA �When we found out that the left engine was undamaged prior to impact, it really changed the course of our investigation in terms of focusing more on the crew actions.� SATHYA SILVA �We pulled a flight path from the radar data.� BILL BRAMBLE �I�ve got the CVR data. And here�s a copy of the transcript.� Investigators turn to the cockpit voice recorder, or CVR, of Flight 810 to determine why the pilots thought the left engine failed as the evidence suggests it did not. SATHYA SILVA �Let�s hear it from takeoff.� CAPTAIN OKAI �80 knots (150 kilometers per hour).� FIRST OFFICER RYAN �Check.� CAPTAIN OKAI �V1. Rotate. V2. Positive rate.� FIRST OFFICER RYAN �Gear up. Damn.� SATHYA SILVA �Stop. Did you hear that? Play it again.� FIRST OFFICER RYAN �Gear up.� BILL BRAMBLE �It definitely sounds like an engine surge.� SATHYA SILVA �Most likely the blades breaking apart in the right engine. Keep playing.� CAPTAIN OKAI �Lost an engine. You got it?� FIRST OFFICER RYAN �Yeah. I got it.� CAPTAIN OKAI �Yep. Looks like you lost number...� FIRST OFFICER RYAN �Number two.� CAPTAIN OKAI �Number two.� SATHYA SILVA �Hold it right there.� BILL BRAMBLE �They both said number two � the right engine.� SATHYA SILVA �They were correct.� BILL BRAMBLE �So why did they think that the left engine had failed?� LORENDA WARD �We were able to hear the crew discuss � they had correctly identified the right engine. So at some point, you know, in their mindset, it flipped to the wrong engine.� SATHYA SILVA �Let�s hear what happens next.� FIRST OFFICER RYAN �Flaps.� CAPTAIN OKAI �Turn 220 heading. I�ll give you the flaps. Rhoades 810. We have an emergency. Standby. We�re on 220 heading. You can inch up to 2,000 (610 meters).� BILL BRAMBLE �The captain calls in the emergency. Tells the first officer to climb to a safe altitude. It all sounds good.� CAPTAIN OKAI �We�re on 220 heading.� CONTROLLER �Say again. Heading two four zero.� CAPTAIN OKAI �Two four zero heading, Rhoades 810.� CONTROLLER �No Rhoades eight zero nine. Rhoades eight zero nine, left two four zero.� SATHYA SILVA �It sounds like there�s some overlap with another Transair Flight.� BILL BRAMBLE �According to these transcripts, the captain spends the next minute and forty seconds communicating with the CONTROLLER.� SATHYA SILVA �That�s a long time in a critical moment.� CONTROLLER �Rhoades Express 810, you are cleared visual approach runway four right.� CAPTAIN OKAI �Okay Rhoades 810. We�re gonna run a checklist. I�ll let you know when we�re ready to come to the airport.� SATHYA SILVA �When you have an emergency situation, it is important to aviate, navigate and communicate. And your third priority is communicating your emergency.� SATHYA SILVA �What happens next?� CAPTAIN OKAI �Okay. I have control.� FIRST OFFICER RYAN �Roger.� CAPTAIN OKAI �Okay. Let�s see what�s the problem. What�s going on with the gauges?� SATHYA SILVA �The captain starts flying the plane and turns his attention to the engines.� FIRST OFFICER RYAN �So it looks like the number one.� CAPTAIN OKAI �Number one�s gone?� FIRST OFFICER RYAN �Gone, yeah. We still have the number two.� CAPTAIN OKAI �So we have number two. Okay.� SATHYA SILVA �Stop. The FO changes his diagnosis.� CAPTAIN OKAI �Yup. It looks like we lost number�� FIRST OFFICER RYAN �Number two.� FIRST OFFICER RYAN �So it looks like the number one.� CAPTAIN OKAI �Number one�s gone?� FIRST OFFICER RYAN �Gone, yeah.� BILL BRAMBLE �Why?� BILL BRAMBLE �It wasn�t clear why they had changed their minds about it.� BILL BRAMBLE �The captain then instructs the FO to do the engine shutdown checklist but he only gets through the first step.� FIRST OFFICER RYAN �Hey, we�re red line here. We should pull back on the right one a little bit.� CAPTAIN OKAI �Okay.� BILL BRAMBLE �Once the crew had convinced themselves that they had a dual engine failure, they were focused almost exclusively on altitude and airspeed and eventually they ran out of options and had to ditch.� BILL BRAMBLE �It�s clear that the right engine, the one with the issue is overheating and not producing full thrust. But what led them to think the left engine wasn�t working?� SATHYA SILVA �Let�s see what the flight data recorder can tell us.� SATHYA SILVA �Okay. Let�s see what the engines were doing.� BILL BRAMBLE �After the right engine failed, both engines are brought back to flight idle once they level off at 2000 feet (610 meters). That�s proper procedure to get the speed down.� SATHYA SILVA �But the first officer never told the captain he brought the engines back to idle.� SATHYA SILVA �It was procedure for a crew member to verbalize when they moved the engine controls. In this case, the first officer actually did not do that and that could have affected the captain�s situational awareness of where those engine throttles were.� SATHYA SILVA �Send someone to interview the first officer again about bringing the throttles back.� BILL BRAMBLE �So it was critical for us to get more information to better understand what had happened there.� SATHYA SILVA �Did anyone actually ever test the throttles?� BILL BRAMBLE �No. The left engine throttle stayed at idle for the rest of the flight.� BILL BRAMBLE �If you�re going into the water and you have no other option left, you�re gonna firewall both throttles just in case it might help.� SATHYA SILVA �Why didn�t the captain check the first officer�s misdiagnosis?� BILL BRAMBLE �Let�s ask him.� BILL BRAMBLE �When the first officer subsequently said it was the number one, the captain just accepted it. He didn�t effectively crosscheck that erroneous assertion. So we wanted to ask him why. Why did he accept that?� BILL BRAMBLE �CAPTAIN OKAI. Thanks for meeting with me again. You�re muted.� CAPTAIN OKAI �Sorry about that. Glad I can help.� BILL BRAMBLE �When Greg told you the left engine had failed, do you recall initially thinking the right one had failed?� CAPTAIN OKAI �No. The thing with Greg is I�ve flown with him so many times. He�s never made a mistake. If Greg says the left is gone, the left engine is gone.� SATHYA SILVA �While trust is very important, when it comes to crew resource management, you also want to verify. The captain did not verify the information that the first officer was giving him.� BILL BRAMBLE �Okay. Thank you.� CAPTAIN OKAI �Sure thing.� BILL BRAMBLE �It�s really critical when you do have an engine failure to look at all the available information and cross-check and agree that you have identified the correct engine. In this case, that didn't occur.� SATHYA SILVA �What were the power readings when the engines were at idle?� BILL BRAMBLE �The left engine was 1.05 and the right 1.12.� CAPTAIN OKAI �Okay. Let�s see what�s the problem. What�s going on with the gauges?� SATHYA SILVA �They did have slightly different power outputs, and that is something you would see with two different engines.� SATHYA SILVA �That could have really affected the captain�s decision-making.� FIRST OFFICER RYAN �So it looks like the number one.� CAPTAIN OKAI �Number one�s gone?� FIRST OFFICER RYAN �Gone, yeah.� CAPTAIN OKAI �So we have number two. Okay.� BILL BRAMBLE �If the first officer had said hey, I pulled the thrust back on both engines, then that might have caused the captain to engage in a different thought process about what might be going on.� SATHYA SILVA �First officer follow-up interview.� SATHYA SILVA �He has no recollection of bringing either thrust lever back to idle.� BILL BRAMBLE �We believe that the first officer forgot because he was busy. That leads to stress. Stress leads to tunneling of attention. That can lead to fixation on a small number of parameters.� BILL BRAMBLE �But even if the first officer didn�t tell the captain about the thrust levers, there must have been other signs which engine failed. Check out the rudder data. Immediately after the right engine failed on takeoff, 5.5 degrees of left rudder is applied.� CAPTAIN OKAI �You got it?� FIRST OFFICER RYAN �Yeah. I got it.� BILL BRAMBLE �The foot that isn�t pressing on the rudder pedal is the side with the bad engine. So it�s usually a pretty clear indication of which engine has failed.� BILL BRAMBLE �He held that left rudder for three minutes. He had a clear indicator, but it never registered.� ROBERT GRAVES �It�s very possible that under those stressful conditions in the middle of the night over the water, you could make that mistake.� SATHYA SILVA �They made the right assessment initially, but in the end, the stress of the situation degraded their ability to fly the plane.� FIRST OFFICER RYAN �Damn.� ... both pilots make the proper assessment. CAPTAIN OKAI �Yep, looks like we lost number...� FIRST OFFICER RYAN �Number two.� CAPTAIN OKAI �Number two.� CAPTAIN OKAI �Okay Rhoades 810. We�re gonna run a checklist.� CAPTAIN OKAI �Okay. Let�s see what�s the problem.� CAPTAIN OKAI �What�s going on with the gauges?� FIRST OFFICER RYAN �So it looks like the number one.� CAPTAIN OKAI �Number one�s gone?� FIRST OFFICER RYAN �Gone, yeah. We still have the number two.� CAPTAIN OKAI �So we have number two. Okay.� CAPTAIN OKAI �How�s the EGT?� FIRST OFFICER RYAN �Uh it�s max. It�s beyond max.� GPWS �Terrain. Terrain. Pull up.� CAPTAIN OKAI �We�re in the water. We�re in the water!� SATHYA SILVA �The pilots� misidentification of the damaged engine, and their use of the only�� SATHYA SILVA �While it may be disappointing that the crew never actually touched their left engine that was working properly, it is a testament to the human limitations that actually arise when you have stressful, high workload situations. And that�s what we need to account for.� With only fifty 737-200s remaining in service, it�s deemed impractical to fit them with engine sensors that would alert pilots to a failed engine. But it�s now standard in most passenger airliners. SATHYA SILVA �Engine monitoring technology has improved considerably since this aircraft was manufactured. Newer airplanes actually give very clear indications to the pilot regarding which engine is bad and reduces the risk of the crew misidentifying it.� NARRATION Above the Pacific Ocean, the pilots of Transair flight 810 can�t get their cargo plane to climb. Remarkably, they survive the crash and are rescued by the Coast Guard. It�s the middle of the night at Daniel K. Inouye International Airport in Honolulu, Hawaii. Crews have just finished loading cargo for Transair Flight 810. The captain of tonight�s flight is Henry Okai. He has almost 16,000 flying hours. First Officer Gregory Ryan is a lawyer who recently returned to flying part-time for Transair. Transair flights use Rhoades Express as a call sign. Transair is owned and operated by Rhoades Aviation, which transports cargo between the Hawaiian Islands. The plane is a Boeing 737-200 built in the 1960s and 70s for passenger travel. Today, they�re workhorses for transporting cargo. The pilots prepare for takeoff. Tonight�s flight is a short hop to Kahului on the neighboring island of Maui, only a hundred miles (160 kilometers) away. At 133 am, CAPTAIN OKAI hands over the plane to FIRST OFFICER RYAN. Within seconds of lifting off� The pilots have lost thrust in one of their engines only 390 feet (119 meters) off the ground. The first officer levels the plane and continues to climb away from the airport. The captain wants to put more distance between the plane and the ocean, so they have space to address the problem. The controller clears flight 810 to return to the airport. Flight 810 has been in the air less than three minutes flying over the Pacific Ocean on a very dark night. The pilots troubleshoot the situation. They confirm they�ve lost their number one � or left � engine. They now must rely on their right engine to return to the airport. As the pilots zero in on the problem engine, the situation intensifies. The right engine is now overheating, and they�re losing altitude. Captain Okai wants to assess the situation further before returning to the airport. The pilots have descended too low to see the airport. Only the lights on the shoreline are visible. The captain has no other option but to increase power to the overheating engine, risking a double engine failure. The temperature of the right engine is now dangerously high, and the pilots suspect it could fail at any moment. Fearing the worst, the first officer suggests configuring the plane for a water landing. The Captain�s efforts to reduce the loss in altitude aren�t working. As Transair Flight 810 descends below 400 feet (120 meters), the CONTROLLER is automatically alerted to the aircraft�s dangerously low altitude. The pilots now face the possibility of losing both engines. If the engine temperature has improved, they might be able to climb. The chances of reaching the airport six miles (10 kilometers) away deteriorate as the plane descends even further. The controller has an idea. There�s a closer airport. It might be the pilots� last hope. If they can�t make it to the closer airport, there might be no other option than to ditch the 737 into the Pacific Ocean and hope for rescue. The pilots of Transair Flight 810 have one last chance to reach land. But it�s too late. Twelve minutes after takeoff, Transair Flight 810 hits the ocean just two miles (three kilometers) from the Kalaeloa airport. Coast Guard Air Rescue is immediately dispatched. Forty-five minutes later, there�s still no sign of the plane or the pilots. Rescuers fear the worst, until� It�s CAPTAIN OKAI. They soon spot the first officer on a cargo pallet, bleeding from the head. The tail section the captain had been clinging to sinks beneath the waves. They race back and deploy the rescue swimmer. The first officer is soon rescued by a fire department vessel as the captain is rushed to a local hospital. Both pilots survive. While the pilots recover from their injuries, investigators from the National Transportation Safety Board � or NTSB � arrive on the scene. Investigators turn to the CONTROLLER to determine what might have caused Transair Flight 810 to ditch into the Pacific. Could Transair 810 have really lost both engines? Another NTSB team is tasked with recovering the airplane and its engines lying 350 feet (107 meters) deep on the ocean floor. It will take time for the investigation to secure the necessary equipment from a salvage company on the mainland. Investigators meet with CAPTAIN OKAI to determine if Transair Flight 810 did lose both engines. The captain explains he first lost power in the left engine and was losing power in the right. What could have caused both engines to fail so soon after takeoff? But those vital clues remain out of reach, deep on the bottom of the sea. Could contaminated fuel have brought down Transair Flight 810? The US Navy conducts the testing. When the fuel samples are analyzed, the results are conclusive. Hawaii is in an active volcano zone. Could volcanic ash have caused the engines to fail? In 1982, a British Airways 747 traveling from England to New Zealand flew through an ash cloud over Indonesia. All four engines failed. The plane was high enough for pilots to be able to restart the engines, find an airport and land safely. In the meantime, recovery crews pinpoint the exact location of the plane. It has settled on the ocean floor in two large pieces. It means another delay for investigators. The team digs into the engine history of the accident aircraft to determine why both engines might have failed. Investigators look into service reports filed by Transair with the Federal Aviation Administration, or FAA, to see if the aircraft had any history of engine troubles. Did an aging aircraft put the lives of two pilots in jeopardy? The team researches the repair work that�s been performed on the engines over the years. Investigators uncover internal Transair reports revealing issues with the engines. Investigators don�t find any maintenance issues that would have brought down Flight 810. With a salvage company in place and the weather clearing, the NTSB is finally able to attempt the recovery of Flight 810 from 350 feet (107 meters) of water. The wreckage is successfully raised in two large pieces. The black boxes are recovered from the rear fuselage and sent to Washington for analysis. The engines are retrieved separately and brought to a warehouse for inspection. Investigators begin with an examination of the right engine, the one the pilots say was overheating. They perform a borescope inspection of the right engine. It enables them to examine the engine interior without the need for disassembly. Investigators discover two fractured turbine blades which caused shrapnel damage inside the right engine. Investigators turn their attention to the left engine. The pilots said the left engine failed, followed by the right but investigators can�t find anything wrong with the left engine. They discover that Flight 810 suffered engine trouble 17 seconds after takeoff. The pilots� original assessment matches what investigators have discovered. The initial problem was with the right engine. Investigators learn that instead of monitoring the engines� ... the captain is distracted by a conversation with the CONTROLLER. Investigators confirm that the first officer correctly assesses that the right engine lost power on takeoff. But less than four minutes later, he tells Captain Okai it�s the left engine that�s failed. The right engine overheats because of the internal damage, leading the pilots to believe they�re losing both engines. Investigators examine the engine power data of Flight 810 to determine what actions the pilots took that led them to believe their perfectly working engine, the left one, had failed. They discover a key step missing in the pilots� actions. Why did the first officer fail to inform the captain of his action? After they leveled off, the pilots could have increased power to the left engine to confirm which engine had failed. Investigators speak to CAPTAIN OKAI one more time to find out why he thought the left engine had failed. Investigators learn the captain put his faith in his first officer�s diagnosis. Even if the captain trusted the first officer, wouldn�t there be other indicators showing which engine had failed? The team discovers the power was a bit lower on the left engine even though both engines were set to idle. If the captain had checked the gauges, the readings would have supported his first officer�s report that the left engine had failed. But this doesn�t explain why the first officer never told the captain that he brought both throttles back in the first place. Why didn�t the first officer of Transair Flight 810 tell the captain he brought the power levers back after the right engine failed? After the right engine lost power on takeoff, the plane pulled to the right. When the first officer applied the left rudder, the plane straightened out. The fact that the first officer was applying left rudder was an indication that the right engine had lost power. Investigators now know the series of events that led to the ditching of Transair Flight 810. When the right engine loses power after takeoff� But while the captain communicates with air traffic control� ... the first officer reduces engine power. In a moment of stress, he forgets to tell the captain. The slightly different readings on the gauges lead the pilots to believe the fully functioning left engine has failed. The captain relies on the first officer�s assessment without doing his own analysis of the situation. Instead of confirming which engine had actually lost power and forgetting their original assessment, the pilots end up flying on a damaged engine. Setting them up for an inevitable ditching. Before the NTSB�s final report is published, Rhoades Aviation is shut down by the Federal Aviation Administration for numerous safety and maintenance violations.