AL_DICKINSON APPROACH_CONTROLLER ATC_SUPERVISOR ATIS AUTOMATION BOB_BENZON CAPTAIN_LEE CAPTAIN_ROSAYE CAPTAIN_STAVEREN CONTROLLER COR_TEN_HOVE FIRST_OFFICER_CLEMENKOWFF FIRST_OFFICER_NAUD FIRST_OFFICER_RICHARDS FLIGHT_ATTENDANT FLIGHT_ENGINEER_GLANS GARY_GLANS GPWS HEBB_RUSSELL INVESTIGATOR INVESTIGATOR_TWO JOANN JOHN_COX JOHN_NANCE LEAD_INVESTIGATOR MALE_PASSENGER MARY_SCHIAVO NARRATION NTSB_INVESTIGATOR PASSENGER PEDRO_MATOS PHILIPPE_LACAILLE RIDGE_INVESTIGATOR SUPERVISOR TODD_CURTIS TONY_JAMES TRAFFIC_CONTROLLER NARRATION On final approach in stormy weather� ... a DC-10 hits the runway too hard. Two pilots descend so far below minimum altitude� ... they shear off treetops. A flight crew fighting crosswinds ends up halfway down the landing strip. Three touchdowns in adverse weather. Three split-second calls that went terribly wrong. INVESTIGATORs wonder� was it pilot error? Or were the situations outside their control? Martinair Flight 495 is nearing Portugal�s southern coast. The captain is 56-year-old Willem Van Staveren. He�s been with Martinair for 24 years. The First Officer is 31-year-old Ronald Clemenkowff. He�s been flying with the Dutch company for three years. The youngest on the flight deck is 29-year-old Flight Engineer Gary Glans. The crew is flying a DC-10, a three-engine wide-body jet. There are 13 crew members and 327 PASSENGERs on board. Flight 495 is near the end of a two-and-a-half-hour trip from Amsterdam to Portugal�s Faro Airport. As they descend towards Faro, the pilots expect to encounter some bad weather. The plane descends through the storm clouds. Less than a minute from touchdown, the weather deteriorates even more. Flight 495 slides more than 350 feet off the runway. Firefighters and rescue crews rush to the crash site. It�s one of Portugal�s worst air disasters. Fifty-six people are dead. Two hundred and eighty-four people make it out alive. INVESTIGATORs from Portugal�s General Directorate of Civil Aviation and from the US�s National Transportation Safety Board arrive to inspect the wreckage of Martinair Flight 495 and find out why a DC-10 had such a catastrophic landing at a modern, well- equipped airport. The team recovers the black boxes containing the Flight Data Recorder and Cockpit Voice Recorder. A quarter of a mile from the runway�s threshold, INVESTIGATORs discover where the plane�s landing gear first came into contact with the tarmac. They discover that part of the right landing gear is broken. Why did the plane land so hard? INVESTIGATORs review the captain�s statement. But when INVESTIGATORs interview the air traffic CONTROLLER, he downplays the crew�s report. Windshear is an extreme shift in the speed and direction of the wind. Runway sensors would have detected any such shift but reported none. A week after the crash of Flight 495, the cockpit voice recording is ready to be reviewed. On final approach, the crew is informed the runway is flooded. In a positive landing, the pilot touches down with enough force to break through a layer of water and prevent hydroplaning. INVESTIGATORs wonder why this positive landing was so forceful that it fractured the right- side gear. INVESTIGATORs learn there was a surge in engine power three quarters of a mile from the runway threshold. The power suddenly fell to engine idle. Without sufficient power, the plane hit the runway with enough force to crack the landing gear. A Martinair DC-10 has crash landed at an airport in Portugal. The touchdown was so hard it broke the plane�s undercarriage. INVESTIGATORs are convinced adverse weather was a factor in the plane�s speed. But how bad was it? A microburst is a column of air that descends from rain clouds, hits the ground and spreads horizontally. It can lead to significant fluctuations in a plane�s airspeed. INVESTIGATORs compare the timing of the microbursts with the auto-throttle data. As Flight 495 passed through each microburst, the auto throttles made adjustments for the shifting winds. In order to get the plane on the ground, the first officer overrode the auto-throttle and reduced the power to idle. The captain tried to stop the plane�s uncontrolled descent� But it was too late. The INVESTIGATORs suspect the winds were much faster than the 20 knots the pilots were advised. Their suspicions are presented to the air traffic CONTROLLER who oversaw Martinair Flight 495. The information the CONTROLLER was giving the crew was actually coming from the wrong end of the runway. INVESTIGATORs now know what brought down Flight 495. Just as the pilots are about to land, a series of microbursts cause the engines� auto throttles to sharply increase speed. The first officer reduces power to idle just as the last microburst occurs. Flight 495 slams to the ground. In their report into the crash of Martinair Flight 495, INVESTIGATORs make a series of recommendations. Shortly after the crash, Faro Airport upgraded its wind sensors and displays to comply with international regulations. A different runway incident reveals the importance of landing procedures in adverse weather and the dangers of ignoring them. On a stormy November night, American Airlines flight 1572 cruises 35,000 feet above Pennsylvania. Captain Kenneth Lee, a former military pilot, has been flying with American Airlines for ten years. First Officer John Richards also flew in the military, followed by seven years of commercial aviation experience. They�re flying the MD-83, a twin-engine, narrow body jet. It�s a two-hour flight from Chicago�s O�Hare Airport to Bradley International Airport at Windsor Locks, Connecticut. There are 5 crewmembers and 73 PASSENGERs on board. The storm isn�t just a threat to aircraft. A major leak in the control tower has forced tower CONTROLLERs to leave their posts. Like most large airports, air traffic control at Bradley International has two areas for managing incoming and outgoing flights approach control, typically located on one of the lower floors, and tower control for landings and takeoffs. Flight 1572 is on final approach. The SUPERVISOR in Approach Control decides to provide Flight 1572 with some guidance. Flight 1572 is still two and a half miles from the runway. The pilots lift the nose in an attempt to recover. The pilots lose an engine as they try to climb out of trouble. The right engine also fails. The MD-83 is now a 60-ton glider. The plane drifts off course. Flight 1572 has landed safely. Incredibly, there�s only one minor injury. But what nearly brought down Flight 1572 is a mystery. It will be up to INVESTIGATORs from the NTSB to solve it. Bob Benzon heads up the team. Mangled branches in the plane�s engines indicate they were working normally. INVESTIGATORs wonder how an American Airlines MD-83 ended up flying low enough to strike trees on approach to Bradley International Airport. The team discovers that when Flight 1572 hit trees, it was forty-eight feet below the altitude of the ridgeline. The minimum descent altitude, or MDA, is the lowest altitude a crew should descend to until they can see the runway, a protocol designed to keep planes above terrain and any obstructions. The cockpit voice recording may provide a clue. The team hears the air traffic control SUPERVISOR giving the crew guidance to land. As they neared the ground, the crew decided to make their final descent at a thousand feet per minute, nearly double what is normal. INVESTIGATORs track the plane�s descent by comparing the cockpit conversations with radar beacon data. But they don�t hear any more altitude calls after that. What they do hear is even more unusual. The CVR reveals that the first officer mishandled the remaining callouts. But the update is never provided. INVESTIGATORs need the approach CONTROLLER to explain why. But that�s not the altimeter setting the pilots were given. INVESTIGATORs calculate that the outdated altimeter setting provided by the tower would have resulted in the pilots flying lower than they realized. INVESTIGATORs now understand what happened to flight 1572. Only one question remains. INVESTIGATORs turn to Flight 1572�s Flight Data Recorder for the answer. The data showed that the crew quickly configured the plane for a go around. Despite the captain�s impressive recovery, the NTSB�s final report concludes that the probable cause of this accident was the crew flying below the minimum descent altitude before they could see the runway. The NTSB also recommends that in conditions where pressure is falling rapidly, CONTROLLERs should increase the frequency of altimeter setting updates. When an Air France Airbus runs out of runway during a stormy landing in Toronto, INVESTIGATORs learn there�s more than weather to blame. Air France Flight 358 is holding above Toronto�s Pearson International Airport, awaiting a break in a storm. The Airbus A340 is arriving from Paris with 297 PASSENGERs. The Captain is 57-year-old Alain Rosaye. He has more than 20 years� flying experience. The First Officer is 43-year-old Frederic Naud. Rain is pelting Pearson�s runways, but the crew is still cleared to land. The pilots configure the plane for landing. Flight 358 is assigned runway two-four-left, which will allow them to land into the wind. The plane approaches the runway. The PASSENGERs� applause is premature. The plane is still going 90 miles an hour when it reaches the end of the runway. The plane finally stops two hundred yards beyond the runway. The smell of jet fuel fills the cabin. Panic spreads quickly. Emergency crews are at the crash site in seconds. But getting close to the plane is dangerous. If fire from a burning engine spreads to the fuel tanks, they could explode. A busy highway borders the airport. It�s packed with thousands of vehicles. PASSENGER cars become ambulances for the wounded. Remarkably, all the PASSENGERs and crew members from flight 358 have made it out alive. The A340 has an enviable safety record, but this one is a charred ruin. What went wrong onboard Air France 358? It will be up to a team from Canada�s Transportation Safety Board to find the answer. Air France flight 358 landed during a ferocious storm at Toronto�s airport. But was the weather the only thing that caused the plane to overrun the runway? Two other planes touched down on the same runway minutes before the Air France flight. Their crews reported the difficult conditions to Air Traffic Control. Twenty knot winds are strong, but well within the allowable range for landing an A340. Yet when INVESTIGATORs study radar images of the airport, they discover the winds were in excess of that range. As Flight 358 landed, a sharp line of rain moved across the runway from north to south driven by a sudden 33 knot gust of wind, a wind speed much greater than anticipated. When INVESTIGATORs study the airport layout, they find another piece of the puzzle. The storm was forcing air traffic CONTROLLERs to use runway two-four-left for landings. It�s the shortest runway at the airport, around 2100 feet shorter than some of the others. However, even in poor conditions, it should have been long enough. INVESTIGATORs need to find out why it wasn�t. But before they finish their work, media reports in France suggest that the thrust reversers, which use the jet�s engines to slow it down, were not engaged as soon as they should have been. INVESTIGATORs discover 17 seconds elapsed before the thrusters reached maximum power. Compounding the problem, the plane didn�t touch down until the runway�s halfway point. That left only five thousand feet to bring the plane to a stop. With the delayed activation of the thrust reversers, five thousand feet was not enough. Following the investigation, the TSB recommends extending runway safety zones to 328 yards. Landing is the most dangerous part of a flight. But for Air France 358, bad weather and a short runway proved to be insurmountable obstacles. The accident could have been much worse. Due to the quick and professional reaction of the cabin crew, everyone on board survived. Captain Lee tries to line it back up with the runway. invastigators interview the first officer. Pilots must calibrate and recalibrate the altimeters based on atmospheric pressure, which can change dramatically due to fluctuating weather. Captain Rosaye realizes the plane is now well past the runway�s threshold. FIRST OFFICER CLEMENKOWFF I can�t see anything. CAPTAIN STAVEREN I'm on it. COR TEN HOVE We heard an enormous bang. CAPTAIN LEE The left motor�s failed. CAPTAIN LEE What the...? CAPTAIN ROSAYE Put it down! JOHN NANCE You're gonna have to make a very rapid judgment of whether or not you can stop on the available runway. INVESTIGATOR Look at this. LEAD INVESTIGATOR With so little power, they would have dropped like a rock. CAPTAIN STAVEREN Approach, Martinair four niner five. Good morning. FIRST OFFICER CLEMENKOWFF Descending to level seven zero. GARY GLANS On a night like this with a lot of weather over Europe, you don't get a lot of, uh, light from the cities below. Uh you just have the stars and, and the cloud deck. FIRST OFFICER CLEMENKOWFF Oh. Raining cats and dogs over there. GARY GLANS The captain chose to be the pilot monitoring so he could oversee the whole approach and let the first officer focus on just flying the aircraft. CONTROLLER Martinair Four Nine Five, cleared to land runway one-one. The wind, one five-zero, one-five knots maximum two-zero. CAPTAIN STAVEREN Cleared to land. FIRST OFFICER CLEMENKOWFF Windshield anti-ice! I can't see anything. CAPTAIN STAVEREN I'm on it. FLIGHT ENGINEER GLANS Wipers are on fast. COR TEN HOVE All of a sudden, we heard an enormous bang. GARY GLANS I was pretty sure we were gonna be crushed. LEAD INVESTIGATOR It�s amazing so many survived. NTSB INVESTIGATOR Let's hope we get the data back quickly. PEDRO MATOS We needed to try to understand what happened in the final moments of the flight, in terms of speeds, in terms of decisions, and also what happened just before touchdown. LEAD INVESTIGATOR Wow. Look at this. AL DICKINSON There was a two-inch deep cut down the left side of the runway. LEAD INVESTIGATOR So it hit here and then veered off to the right. PEDRO MATOS The scratches we saw on the runway revealed to us that the plane had landed very hard. So that's why the marks were deep. LEAD INVESTIGATOR Now this is very strange. JOHN COX The forces necessary to shear the landing gear like that is massive. INVESTIGATOR TWO The approach was normal. At 200 feet we were on the centerline. So they should have been okay. But a few seconds later, the captain sees lightning. I suddenly felt a high sink rate. It all happened so fast. The aircraft actually fell out of the sky." AUTOMATION Sink Rate. GARY GLANS It felt like you were just being slammed into the ground. LEAD INVESTIGATOR The first officer stated the weather was bad and it was raining heavily. It was gusty and very turbulent. CONTROLLER There was rain, but other planes were taking off and landing without difficulty. CONTROLLER Martinair 4-9-5, cleared to land runway one-one. The wind one-five-zero, one-five knots, maximum two zero. LEAD INVESTIGATOR What about wind shear? Did the runway sensors pick up anything? CONTROLLER Yes, there were wind shear warnings, but they happened after the aircraft had already crashed. PEDRO MATOS There was conflicting information between what the crew said and what the air traffic CONTROLLER reports. AL DICKINSON The best thing to substantiate what went on was to take a really deep look at what the pilots were saying to each other in the cockpit. FIRST OFFICER CLEMENKOWFF You call approaching minimums and field in sight. You look outside. Wet runway. CAPTAIN STAVEREN You have to make a positive landing. TODD CURTIS Water on the runway made it less likely that braking would be effective. And wind meant that the airplane, depending on the wind change, could be pushed further down the runway, leaving it less room to stop. CAPTAIN STAVEREN Speed is low. Low! Throttles! LEAD INVESTIGATOR Why does the captain yell, throttles? INVESTIGATOR TWO Let's look at the airspeed data. LEAD INVESTIGATOR So it looks like they�re flying steady at 145 knots until here. Then airspeed jumps and then drops all the way to 139 knots. CAPTAIN STAVEREN Speed is a bit low. Speed is low. LEAD INVESTIGATOR These fluctuations seem too extreme to be caused by the 20 knot winds reported by the CONTROLLER. INVESTIGATOR TWO What about auto-throttle data? LEAD INVESTIGATOR Yeah, the fluctuations in auto-throttles correspond to the airspeed fluctuations. INVESTIGATOR TWO Wow. Look at that. 102% power. JOHN COX It would be similar to the amount of power that you would use for takeoff, too much power to try to land with. INVESTIGATOR TWO And then here. Power drops to 40 percent. INVESTIGATOR TWO The only way the throttles would move that quick would be if the pilot was manually adjusting them down. JOHN COX The first officer, who�s the flying pilot, made the decision to override the auto throttle system and to pull the power up all the way back to flight idle. LEAD INVESTIGATOR With so little power, they would have dropped like a rock. INVESTIGATOR Look at this. INVESTIGATOR TWO Why would the crew reduce power by so much so far from the runway threshold? They hit no less than three separate microbursts in the last minute of flight. INVESTIGATOR TWO This last one was the worst. The wind speed jumped from the reported 20 knots to 40 knots. INVESTIGATOR TWO They line up. LEAD INVESTIGATOR Mm hmm. INVESTIGATOR TWO The first officer likely would have been overwhelmed by the unexpected change in the weather. LEAD INVESTIGATOR And knowing that he needed to make a positive landing at the runway threshold, he sees the power spike to 102% and takes corrective action. INVESTIGATOR TWO He cut the power at the exact same time that last downburst hit them. CAPTAIN STAVEREN Throttles! LEAD INVESTIGATOR Can you show me the actual data for runway 1-1? CONTROLLER According to the raw data, the winds were gusting at 35 knots. LEAD INVESTIGATOR How could you have under-reported the wind conditions? CONTROLLER We receive wind data every 30 seconds from this device. It must have been switched to runway 2-9 instead of runway 1-1. JOHN COX The C�s information was not representative of what was actually occurring on the runway. PEDRO MATOS If the pilots were aware, they would have gone around. FIRST OFFICER CLEMENKOWFF I can't see anything. CAPTAIN STAVEREN I�m on it. GPWS Sink Rate. Fifty. JOHN COX This says additional pilot training. This says wind shear detection systems on airplanes. JOHN COX The critical information that CONTROLLERs provide to pilots needs to be accurate. So these are some of the lessons that the industry learned and implemented following this accident. CAPTAIN LEE Smoother ride up here than at 33,000. FIRST OFFICER RICHARDS That�s for sure. CAPTAIN LEE Better get the cabin ready for our descent. FIRST OFFICER RICHARDS I'm gonna get the ATIS real quick. ATIS Bradley Airport information, Victor zero three. ATIS, or A-T-I-S stands for Automatic Terminal Information Service. It provides pilots with important data about airport weather and approaches. ATIS Notice to Airmen, runway two four and one five. FIRST OFFICER RICHARDS Both runways are wet. Severe turbulence. CAPTAIN LEE All right. Sounds like it's gonna be a bumpy ride. APPROACH CONTROLLER American 15-72, descend and maintain four thousand. FIRST OFFICER RICHARDS Descending four thousand, 15-72. APPROACH CONTROLLER American 15-72, be advised the tower is closed at this time due to a problem with one of the windows. FIRST OFFICER RICHARDS Copy. CAPTAIN LEE Let�s have gear down. FIRST OFFICER RICHARDS Gear down. SUPERVISOR I�m going up to the tower. APPROACH CONTROLLER American 15-72, there is someone in the tower. It�s not officially open but you can change to tower frequency. FIRST OFFICER RICHARDS Hey tower, American 15-72. We are six miles from runway one five. SUPERVISOR Landing is at your discretion. The runway does appear to be clear. FIRST OFFICER RICHARDS Copy. FIRST OFFICER RICHARDS Flaps and slats to forty-forty. You are cleared to land. There�s a thousand feet. CAPTAIN LEE Okay. CAPTAIN LEE Ugh. What the...? FIRST OFFICER RICHARDS Go! Go around. CAPTAIN LEE Going around. CAPTAIN LEE Flaps fifteen, positive rate, gear up. FIRST OFFICER RICHARDS Gear up. CAPTAIN LEE Left motor�s failed. FIRST OFFICER RICHARDS There�s the runway straight ahead. CAPTAIN LEE Okay. Tell them we�re going down. Tell them emergency. FIRST OFFICER RICHARDS Okay Tower, a call for emergency equipment. We are going down on the runway. SUPERVISOR Looks like we�ve got an emergency on 15-72. Send the trucks. Emergency vehicles have been dispatched. FIRST OFFICER RICHARDS You got it dude. You�re gonna make it. CAPTAIN LEE Hold on, guy. Hold it down buddy. Hold it down. Hold it down. Hold it down. FIRST OFFICER RICHARDS God bless you. You made it. BOB BENZON What have we got so far? BOB BENZON The aircraft was very, very damaged. It, it reminded me of, uh, something like a B-17 that had gone through a raid in World War Two. The aircraft was unflyable. BOB BENZON They definitely hit some trees. INVESTIGATOR Oh they sure did. BOB BENZON And the engines definitely had power when they shredded those branches. INVESTIGATOR If the engines had power, why�d they hit the trees? BOB BENZON The main question became why the aircraft was low enough to hit trees and still make it to the runway. INVESTIGATOR The trees they hit are on top of a ridge, about two and a half miles northwest of the runway. BOB BENZON The chart has the top of the ridge at 819 feet. And do we have an altitude for the tree strike? INVESTIGATOR I need an altitude for the first impact mark. RIDGE INVESTIGATOR 771 feet. INVESTIGATOR They shouldn�t have been anywhere near those trees. INVESTIGATOR They weren't just below the ridge. They dropped 309 feet below the minimum descent altitude. INVESTIGATOR Why would they drop so low? ATC SUPERVISOR Landing is at your discretion. The runway does appear to be clear. FIRST OFFICER RICHARDS Flaps and slats to forty-forty. You are cleared to land. CAPTAIN LEE Okay. Give me a thousand down. FIRST OFFICER RICHARDS One thousand down. BOB BENZON Stop that. A thousand feet a minute? No way. BOB BENZON At a thousand feet per minute, they�re below their MDA in less than a minute. INVESTIGATOR Sure, that's fast. But the first officer should be calling out the altitudes. TONY JAMES The first officer should call out a thousand above the MDA to the captain and then 100 foot to the MDA and then the MDA altitude. BOB BENZON Okay. Let's listen to the first officer�s callout. FIRST OFFICER RICHARDS There�s a thousand feet. INVESTIGATOR Good. He made a thousand foot callout. FIRST OFFICER RICHARDS A thousand and eighty is your uh... CAPTAIN LEE Right. FIRST OFFICER RICHARDS You�re going below your, uh, your... CAPTAIN LEE What the...? BOB BENZON Hang on. Was that the minimum descent altitude callout? INVESTIGATOR I think it was supposed to be. TONY JAMES The first officer started to call out for the MDA but never finished his sentence. INVESTIGATOR So he makes half a call at their minimums. BOB BENZON And then doesn't say anything else until they're below it. INVESTIGATOR And by then they've hit the trees. BOB BENZON Walk me through your actions. FIRST OFFICER RICHARDS I was monitoring the instruments. As we got closer to the minimum descent altitude, I looked outside for the airport. And when I looked back, we were below minimums. FIRST OFFICER RICHARDS You're going below your uh� BOB BENZON During that time he was looking out, he was not monitoring the flight gauges as closely as he should have been. BOB BENZON Why didn't you call for a go around? FIRST OFFICER RICHARDS Well there was no time. We immediately hit the trees. CAPTAIN LEE What the...? INVESTIGATOR Something doesn't add up. The First Officer couldn't have been at his minimums seconds before hitting the trees. BOB BENZON Maybe there was an issue with the altimeter settings? TONY JAMES Well one thing that the crew considers and expects from the tower or air traffic is the update of the weather as po� as quick as possible so they can also amend what they need to do. FIRST OFFICER RICHARDS Bradley Approach, American 15-72. We are at eleven thousand feet. APPROACH CONTROLLER American 15-72, Bradley approach, roger. Expect VOR runway one-five approach. BOB BENZON What was the airport�s altimeter setting at the time of the accident? APPROACH CONTROLLER Let me see. 29.15. BOB BENZON Why didn't the crew receive an updated setting? APPROACH CONTROLLER Um� 29.15. Uh... I didn't think to give it to them. BOB BENZON The pilots did not have the current altimeter setting when they flew the approach. BOB BENZON They thought they were 76 feet higher than they actually were. We know they struck the trees at an altitude of 771 feet. Add 76 feet to that... INVESTIGATOR They wouldn't have hit anything. BOB BENZON No impact. TONY JAMES This was out of the control of the pilots to a certain extent but going below the MDA should have been caught by both the first officer and the captain. This is what created the accident. INVESTIGATOR In the end it came down to the crew�s decision. BOB BENZON The outdated altimeter setting and the rough weather meant that the crew had almost no room for error on the approach. INVESTIGATOR And when they were descending too fast and passed their minimum descent altitude, there was no way they could have recovered before hitting the trees. INVESTIGATOR In spite of hitting the trees, how did they make that landing? BOB BENZON So they hit the trees and they immediately pull the flaps back to 15 and go to max thrust. CAPTAIN LEE Flaps fifteen, positive rate, gear up. FIRST OFFICER RICHARDS Gear up. BOB BENZON Then, just as they begin their go around, they lose their left engine. Followed by their right engine. FIRST OFFICER RICHARDS There�s the runway straight ahead. CAPTAIN LEE Tell them we�re going down, tell them emergency. BOB BENZON They glide down to the runway. BOB BENZON The pilots did not monitor the altitudes they were flying through correctly. They, they should have levelled off at a point and they simply did not do so. JOHN NANCE There are all sorts of things that, that we have to look at and say this isn't a matter of my battling the element and being the good guy who, you know, got the flight through. How do I get this on the ground with the greatest degree of safety? FIRST OFFICER NAUD Five thousand feet. Set. CAPTAIN ROSAYE Ladies and Gentlemen, this is your Captain speaking. We are beginning our descent into Toronto. We should be on the ground at about 4 pm local time. JOANN CORDARY-BUNDOCK The weather outside was definitely within a thunderstorm. But really and truly to me it was just a typical, uh, stormy landing, nothing out of the ordinary. FIRST OFFICER NAUD Flaps two. CAPTAIN ROSAYE Flaps two. FIRST OFFICER NAUD Flaps to full. CAPTAIN ROSAYE Flaps full. TRAFFIC CONTROLLER Air France 3-5-8, this is Toronto tower. CAPTAIN ROSAYE Toronto tower, Air France 3-5-8. Go ahead. TRAFFIC CONTROLLER You are cleared to land runway two-four left. Be advised the preceding aircraft reports braking action is poor and they estimate the surface winds near the runway as 290 degrees at 15 to 20 knots. JOANN CORDARY-BUNDOCK I cinched up my seatbelt tighter than it was because I knew that it was not going to be just a normal landing. FIRST OFFICER NAUD Landing. Auto-pilot, auto-thrust off. CAPTAIN ROSAYE Put it down! Put it down! JOANN CORDARY-BUNDOCK The plane started violently going up and down and it felt like we were going a hundred miles an hour down a road filled with potholes that were about three feet deep. PHILIPPE LACAILLE At that point, I believed that we were all gonna die. It was obvious that no one can survive this kind of thing. MALE PASSENGER Fire! PASSENGER Run! Run! Get out! PASSENGER Open the door! Open the door! PHILIPPE LACAILLE At that point, the, uh, the plane blew up. FIRST OFFICER NAUD Landing. Auto-pilot, auto-thrust off. CAPTAIN ROSAYE Put it down! Put it down! CONTROLLER Air France 3-5-8. Toronto tower. CAPTAIN ROSAYE Toronto tower, Air France 3-5-8. Go ahead. CONTROLLER You are cleared to land runway two-four left. Be advised the preceding aircraft reports braking action is poor and they estimate the surface winds near the runway as 290 degrees at 15 to 20 knots. CAPTAIN ROSAYE Braking poor, fifteen knots... HEBB RUSSELL Thirty-three knots is the demonstrated maximum cross wind for an A340, and that would be on a dry runway. So when you say 33 knots at 90 degrees, you�re... you're encroaching on the limits of the aircraft. HEBB RUSSELL Pilots, as a rule, want to get those reversers in as quickly as possible for maximum stopping. CAPTAIN ROSAYE Put it down! Put� put it down! PASSENGER Fire! FLIGHT ATTENDANT We have to evacuate now! PASSENGER Fire! FLIGHT ATTENDANT Stay calm. JOHN NANCE The thing that keeps coming back to me when I look at accidents like this is discipline, judgment, stabilized approach. MARY SCHIAVO When you're coming in to land, when you are feet or inches above that runway there�s just no margin for error. You have only the runway ahead of you to get the plane stopped and make sure everybody gets off safely.